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INTRODUCTION
This Symposium explores the meaning of personhood as it is or
should be applied to persons with disabilities. This panel focused on the
concept of legal capacity: the ability to make decisions about one’s life—
to exercise agency—and to have those decisions recognized by third
parties. For my part, I would like to discuss how we might push the
boundaries of domestic law—specifically the integration mandate of
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and substantive
due process—to help us move toward a recognition of universal legal
capacity regardless of disability and bring meaningful changes to
domestic guardianship regimes. While Article 12 of the United Nation
(UN) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 1 recognizes
the right to universal legal capacity, the United States has not ratified
that treaty, and domestic law in this area is still underdeveloped. In this
Essay I will argue, as I have in the past, that guardianship constitutes a
failure to provide assistance with decision-making in the least restrictive
manner in violation of the ADA. 2 I will also discuss how principles of
substantive due process may hold promise for helping to both reconceptualize our thinking about guardianship and to bring changes to
guardianship practice. The ultimate goal is to view our social and legal
obligation to persons with limitations in decision-making abilities in the
same way that we understand our obligation to remove barriers
affecting individuals with physical disabilities—that we are obligated to
provide necessary accommodations in the form of services and supports
that enable individuals with cognitive limitations to live as
independently as possible. In this way, individuals with disabilities
affecting decision-making can meaningfully participate in social and
civic life and flourish as full citizens. The right to exercise legal capacity
must be understood as a basic right of personhood.
Since the Supreme Court decided in Cleburne that individuals with
intellectual disabilities were not entitled to any special protection for

1 See G.A. Res. 61/106, art. 12, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Dec.
13, 2006) [hereinafter CRPD].
2 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2012). The ADA’s
integration mandate requires states to “administer services, programs, and activities in the most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.130(d) (2016). The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has interpreted this mandate to
require that government services are provided in “a setting that enables individuals with
disabilities to interact with nondisabled persons to the fullest extent possible . . . .” 28 C.F.R. pt.
35, App. B (2011).
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purposes of equal protection analysis, 3 disability rights advocates have
focused on statutory rather than constitutional claims in cases before
the Supreme Court. 4 With respect to litigation to establish and secure
the rights of persons with disabilities, however, there is some debate
among scholars about whether it is more productive and more
consistent with the overall disability rights project to pursue
constitutional claims to advance the rights of individuals with
disabilities or to rely exclusively on statutory arguments under the ADA.
As Michael Waterstone persuasively argues: “by abandoning
constitutional
claiming,”
advocates
leave
courts
to
“articulat[e] . . . constitutional values without the Constitution,” losing
out on the greater social and legal significance of constitutional rulings. 5
In short, we simply pay more attention when the Court articulates
constitutional principles defining citizenship and personhood.
Notably, in Olmstead, the Court grounded its conclusion that the
ADA provides broad-based protection to individuals with mental
disabilities in references to the historical segregation and resulting
stigma that undergirds the Court’s granting of constitutional protection
to excluded groups. 6 The Olmstead decision is grounded in a conception
of individuals with disabilities as persons entitled to fully participate in
civic life 7 and is often referred to as the Brown v. Board of Education for
individuals with disabilities. So, one could debate whether the type of
vigorous examination of “a group’s claim for full citizenship under our
nation’s governing charter” requires a full-on constitutional analysis, or
whether that same acknowledgement of “the depth of historical
prejudice against people with disabilities” 8 can occur in an ADA
framework.
3 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Bd. of Trs. of the
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 (2001) (re-affirming that conclusion); see also
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445–46 (noting that no class of persons with any type of disability would
be entitled to quasi-suspect equal protection classification).
4 See Michael Waterstone, Backlash, Courts, and Disability Rights, 95 B.U. L. REV. 833,
841–42 (2015) [hereinafter Waterstone, Backlash]. But see Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
5 Michael E. Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law, 63 EMORY L.J. 527, 558 (2014)
[hereinafter Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law]. While Waterstone focuses on
constitutional arguments under the Equal Protection Clause, the same arguments should apply
to arguments relying on the Substantive Due Process Clause, and in fact, the lines between
equal protection and substantive due process are often blurred by the courts. See, e.g.,
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
6 Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 598–601 (1999) (discussing the
stigmatizing injury resulting from discrimination and segregation of individuals with
disabilities but also noting that the ADA itself was intended to be a comprehensive prohibition
of disability-based discrimination designed to address the statutorily recognized historical
segregation, isolation, and stigma experienced by individuals with mental disabilities); id. at 608
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing to Justice Marshall’s dissent in Cleburne).
7 See id.; see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 524–26 (2004) (discussing the history of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities in the context of an ADA challenge).
8 See Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law, supra note 5, at 557.
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Without question, the Olmstead 9 decision affirms the philosophical
and legal significance of the ADA’s integration mandate as a mechanism
for achieving recognition and participation of individuals with
disabilities and provides an important legal basis for challenging
guardianship. Guardianship implicates a person’s ability to participate
in those interactions central to citizenship and one’s self-definition. In
the context of the Symposium’s focus on personhood and the
fundamentally legitimizing power of the Constitution, I would like to
push us beyond the ADA to consider how or why guardianship’s
impermissible and overly broad restrictions on the exercise of autonomy
conflict with principles of substantive due process. Substantive due
process continues to be an essential jurisprudential basis for protecting
the dignity and autonomy of all citizens. 10 For this reason, it is worth
considering how we might use substantive due process principles to
advance the movement toward recognition of universal legal capacity.
My argument here will be based on three ways of viewing
guardianship. The first is that guardianship, and particularly plenary
guardianship, operates as a wholesale restriction on the exercise of many
of the specific liberty interests that have been recognized by our courts.
This would include the rights to contract, work, marry, procreate, raise a
family, vote, make medical treatment decisions, etc. When guardianship
restricts an individual’s ability to exercise these fundamental liberty
interests it constitutes a “massive curtailment of liberty,” 11 akin to that
of involuntary civil commitment. The Supreme Court has determined
that, consistent with substantive due process, the nature and duration of
civil confinement must be reasonably related to its purpose. 12 Under this
view of guardianship, due process places limits on the scope and
duration of a guardianship order.
Second, guardianship is an exercise of State power that removes the
individual’s ability to act on her own behalf to protect herself and her
own interests. In Youngberg v. Romeo, the Supreme Court determined
that when the State involuntarily places a person with a disability in a
state institution, preventing the individual from protecting herself, due
process requires that the State provide her with some modicum of
training to keep her safe and free from restraints. 13 By analogy, once the
State appoints a guardian, thereby limiting the individual’s ability to
Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581.
See, e.g., Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process,
Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 833 (2003).
11 In re Guardianship of Deere, 708 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Okla. 1985); see also, e.g., In re Hedin,
528 N.W.2d 567, 575 (Iowa 1995) (finding that guardianship results in a significant loss of
liberty); In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1090 (Utah 1981) (noting that guardianship results in a
substantial loss of personal freedom).
12 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
13 See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324.
9

10
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protect her own interests, under principles of substantive due process,
the State is obligated to provide that individual with some level of
training to prevent deterioration in decision-making abilities and
potentially help restore or enhance the individual’s ability to manage her
personal and financial needs and regain her right to exercise legal
capacity.
Finally, guardianship is a mechanism that isolates the individual by
making the guardian the conduit for many, or all, of the individual’s
interactions with public and private actors in the community. So, the
person who has a guardian is not the person talking to and interacting
with the doctor or health care provider about medical treatment and
decisions; the person is not the one engaging in financial transactions;
the person is not the one interacting with the landlord and signing the
lease. Rather, the guardian will engage in these interactions on the
individual’s behalf. By functioning in this way, guardianship denies or
seriously restricts the individual’s opportunity for important
interactions with others in the community in violation of the integration
mandate of the ADA.
This Essay will consider these three conceptions of guardianship
and argue that guardianship violates the integration mandate of the
ADA and implicates substantive due process in ways that require
changes in state guardianship regimes, moving us closer to the
recognition of universal legal capacity. The object is to close the front
door to guardianship so that fewer people enter, and open the back
door 14 so that those who neither need nor want guardianship can exit
and ultimately benefit from meaningful and appropriate supports and
services available outside of the guardianship construct.
The Essay will proceed as follows. Part I will summarize the
argument I have made elsewhere—that guardianship is a mechanism of
unnecessary isolation that violates the integration mandate of the ADA.
Much of Part I will focus on more recent cases that apply the integration
mandate to prohibit government policies and practices that isolate
individuals with disabilities living in the community, where there is no
asserted or identified risk of institutionalization. Part II addresses the
substantive due process arguments, explaining why the Supreme Court
decisions in Jackson v. Indiana and Youngberg v. Romeo may be read to
require restrictions on the scope and duration of guardianship and how
Youngberg’s training requirement may require active efforts to restore
the capabilities of an individual subject to guardianship. To be sure, this
Essay will not address all the complexities of the Supreme Court’s
14 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 12 (2012) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Deinstitutionalization Litigation]
(employing this characterization of deinstitutionalization litigation).
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evolving substantive due process doctrine. The purpose here is to
provoke some new thinking about guardianship and to provide some
legal tools to remove or limit guardianships that are rarely empowering,
and in some number of cases, are experienced as demoralizing or
oppressive. 15
In the context of guardianship, we are swimming upstream. The
notion that the State should protect its vulnerable citizens by
designating or appointing someone else to make decisions for them—
that it has an obligation to do so—is one that is deeply rooted in our
historic tradition. It will likely take both constitutional and statutory
arguments to reverse this long-standing parens patriae tradition and
move us toward the recognition of universal legal capacity, with a right
to support if needed. 16
I. GUARDIANSHIP AS A VIOLATION OF THE INTEGRATION MANDATE
OF THE ADA
I have previously written extensively on the topic of guardianship
as an impermissible mechanism of constructive isolation that violates
15 Clients in our clinical program have reported to the author that as a result of the
guardianship they felt that they had lost all self-esteem and self-confidence, that they were able
to manage their affairs and did not need nor want the guardian’s assistance, and that they felt as
though they were always “under the guardian’s thumb” with no ability to do what they wanted
when they wanted. In a recent case in our clinic, a clergyperson referred a client whose ability
to manage her finances was taken away. After the restoration of those rights, the clergyperson
wrote about the client: “The change in her is striking to me. She has more confidence, is taking
better care of herself, and looks much better.” E-mail from Rabbi Jill Hausman, Rabbi, The
Actors’ Temple, New York City, to Leslie Salzman (Aug. 18, 2017, 16:25 EST) (on file with
author); see also Elizabeth Pell & Virginia Mulkern, Supported Decision Making Pilot: Pilot
Program Evaluation Year 2 Report, HUM. SERVICES RES. INST. 5 [hereinafter Pell, Pilot Program
Evaluation],
http://supporteddecisions.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Evaluation-Year-2Report_HSRI-2016_FINAL-2-1.pdf (finding “[o]bservable differences were noticed in the
personal growth of SDM [supported decision making] adopters, along with increased selfesteem and self-advocacy, more engagement in decision making, and increased happiness”).
16 It is worth noting that the trend is in this direction. In August 2017, the American Bar
Association House of Delegates adopted Resolution 113 on Supported Decision Making urging
states to amend their guardianship statutes to provide that supported decision-making is a less
restrictive alternative that must be considered prior to the imposition of guardianship and that
the availability of decision-making supports be considered a basis for the termination of
guardianship and the restoration of the individual’s rights. See 113, A.B.A. [hereinafter ABA
Resolution 113], https://www.americanbar.org/news/reporter_resources/annual-meeting-2017/
house-of-delegates-resolutions/113.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2017); see also Nat’l Conference of
Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Uniform Guardianship, Conservatorship, and Other Protective
Arrangements Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION 36 (July 2017) [hereinafter UGCOPAA], http://
www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Guardianship%20and%20Protective%20Proceedings/
2017AM_UGCOPPA_AsApproved.pdf (providing that guardianship court must find by clear
and convincing evidence that the individual cannot receive and evaluate information or make
or communicate decisions with supportive services, technological assistance or supported
decision making).
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the integration mandate of the ADA. 17 Consequently, here I will
summarize that argument that guardianship violates the disabilitydiscrimination prohibition of the ADA’s integration mandate. The
integration mandate requires that public entities “administer services,
programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the
needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.” 18 The “most integrated
setting” is defined as “a setting that enables individuals with disabilities
to interact with nondisabled persons to the fullest extent possible.” 19
A finding that guardianship violates the ADA 20 is consistent with
the ADA’s statutory purpose to prohibit both active and passive
discrimination and address the continuing and pervasive segregation
and isolation of individuals with disabilities. 21 In Olmstead, the Supreme
Court identified two evils that the ADA’s prohibition against
segregation was designed to address. The first is the assumption that the
individual segregated by society is either incapable or unworthy of
participation in civic and social activities. The second is that the isolated
individual is prevented from engaging in all the important activities and
interactions that give our lives meaning and enrich our existence. 22 Both
of those “evils” exist in the guardianship context.
The ADA claim is predicated on the assumption that guardianship
constitutes a type of constructive isolation of the individual from many
important interactions with persons without disabilities. As I explained
in Rethinking Guardianship:
With the loss of decision-making rights, the individual may be
deprived of opportunities to engage in a range of activities that
enable him or her to interact with others. The individual without the
right to make financial decisions becomes gradually disengaged from
the management of his or her finances and then loses opportunities
for interactions with others involved in that management. This might
mean that the person stops banking because he cannot make
17 For a more extensive discussion of this argument, the reader is referred to Leslie
Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again): Substituted Decision Making as a Violation of the
Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157
(2010) [hereinafter Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship]; Leslie Salzman, Guardianship for
Persons with Mental Illness—a Legal and Appropriate Alternative?, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y 279 (2011) [hereinafter Salzman, Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness].
18 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2016). Public entities must “make reasonable modifications in
policies, practices, or procedures” to avoid such disability-based discrimination, unless those
modifications would “fundamentally alter . . . the service, program, or activity” at issue. 28
C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i).
19 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. B(b).
20 ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2012).
21 See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, From Integrationism to Equal Protection: TenBroek
and the Next 25 Years of Disability Rights, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 13, 16–17 [hereinafter
Bagenstos, The ADA at 25] (discussing the relationship between Olmstead and tenBroek’s
earlier integrationist writings).
22 See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 600–01 (1999).
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withdrawals; stops shopping or going to restaurants because he is
unable to make his own purchases; or stops purchasing gifts for, or
giving monetary gifts to, loved ones because he is unable to do so
without a guardian’s intervention. As a result, the individual is less
likely to interact with shopkeepers, store patrons, vendors, bankers
and even friends. Similarly, if this individual loses the right to make
medical decisions, the providers of medical and health-related
services will likely seek guidance from the guardian rather than from
the individual. The individual may get little information about his or
her condition or treatment options, eventually becoming disregarded
as a participant in the decision-making process and losing
opportunities for important interactions with health professionals
and others working in the healthcare system. Restrictions on the
individual’s ability to travel freely or engage in social interactions and
activities will also have a direct impact on the individual’s ability to
interact with others. In all of these ways, the loss of decision-making
rights can have an isolating effect on the individual with the
disability. 23

Once the constructive isolation of guardianship is established,
there are several additional challenges in trying to state a claim under
Title II’s integration mandate with respect to guardianship. The first
challenge is to characterize guardianship as a governmental service,
program, or activity covered by Title II. 24 Next, the individual involved
in the guardianship challenge must establish that she is a “qualified” 25
individual with a disability. The individual must then establish that the
isolation of guardianship violates the integration mandate even though
the exclusion occurs in the community setting and there is arguably no
risk of institutionalization. In addition, the individual must persuade a
court that the request to move from guardianship to a relationship of
support is not a request for “new services” but only a request that the
services already provided in guardianship be provided in a less isolating
manner. Finally, the individual may need to address an affirmative
defense that the requested change in the State’s service, program, or
activity would not cause a fundamental alteration of the State’s program
for assisting individuals with limitations in decision-making and selfcare.
A.

Government Service, Program, or Activity

The first element of the integration mandate claim that must be
addressed is whether guardianship is a governmental service, program,
23
24
25

Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship, supra note 17, at 168–69.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
Id.

2017]

DOMESTIC LAW & LEGAL CAPACITY

529

or activity covered by Title II. Guardianship may be characterized as a
covered public service in several ways. It can be characterized as a
government’s service, program, or activity that assists citizens who are
deemed incapable of managing their affairs due to limitations in
decision-making abilities. It can also be characterized as a government’s
service, program, or activity that regulates when a citizen can make
legally cognizable decisions or its deliberative process for determining
the same. Finally, guardianship may be characterized as the “statutorily
created” assignment of decision-making rights to a guardian that is then
“recognized and followed” by third parties. 26 However one
conceptualizes the governmental activity involved in guardianship,
there is a reasonable claim that it does constitute a service, program, or
activity under Title II, as the courts have found that Title II covers
virtually everything that a government does. 27
To my knowledge, no court has directly addressed the issue of
whether guardianship is a state service, program, or activity covered by
Title II of the ADA. The ADA challenges that have touched on
guardianship have focused on other activities affected by the
guardianship restriction. For example, in Missouri Protection &
Advocacy Services v. Carnahan, a case where Missouri residents
challenged state laws that disenfranchised individuals subject to plenary
guardianship, the court found the relevant state activity to be that of
voting. 28 Notably, at least one state has listed the modification of its
26 See Hargrave v. Vermont, 340 F.3d 27, 38 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Hargrave v. State, No.
99-128, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26901, at *23 (D. Vt. Oct. 11, 2001)) (concluding in a case
challenging a state law amendment allowing override of a durable power of attorney for health
care upon civil commitment, that Title II covers the statutorily created opportunity to execute a
durable power of attorney for health care and have it be recognized and followed by third
parties).
27 See Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209–10 (1998). Cases have concluded that
Title II covers zoning laws, code enforcement activities, the State’s mental health services
program administered in private adult homes, the substantive decision-making process of
parole proceedings, professional licensing, public contracting, involuntary commitment, and
assisted outpatient treatment laws or processes. See Scharff v. Cty. of Nassau, No. 10-4208, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74787, at *16–22 (E.D.N.Y. June 2, 2014) (concluding that installing and
maintaining pedestrian crossing signals at crosswalks are activities covered by Title II and
collecting cases); Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship, supra note 17, at 202–05; Salzman,
Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness, supra note 17, at 318–20.
28 See Mo. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. V. Carnahan, 499 F.3d 803, 812 (8th Cir. 2007). Last
year, Disability Rights New York (DRNY) filed a federal constitutional and ADA challenge to
New York’s law providing plenary guardianships for persons with intellectual and
developmental disabilities that directly presented the question of whether guardianship—there
characterizing the relevant governmental activity as the operation of the New York courts by
the Office of Court Administration—constitutes a service, program, or activity within the
meaning of Title II. Complaint, Disability Rights New York v. New York State, No. 16-07363
(S.D.N.Y. dismissed Aug. 8, 2017, appeal docketed Sept. 11, 2017) [hereinafter DRNY
Complaint] (challenging Article 17A of the New York Surrogate Court Procedure Act).
Unfortunately, the District Court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the pleadings,
finding that the federal court should abstain from hearing a matter that sought injunctive relief
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guardianship laws as a recommended action in its Olmstead planning
process, suggesting that the State considers guardianship a
governmental activity properly covered by Title II of the ADA. 29
With the exception of public guardianship programs, which are
typically funded and administered by the State, guardianship is not a
government service, program, or activity as we typically understand
those terms. In most (nonpublic) guardianships, the State creates the
statutory construct for guardianship, adjudicates the petition, appoints
the guardian, and is responsible for monitoring the relationship but
neither funds nor directly administers the guardianship. Generally, the
court appoints a private individual to provide the guardianship
“services” and implement the court’s order.
In Tennessee v. Lane, the Supreme Court broadly determined that
the ADA reaches the public services of the administration of justice and
provision of access to the courts. 30 Some courts have been asked to
consider whether Title II covers the substance of proceedings to
terminate parental rights. Those courts have reached different
conclusions for different reasons, with some courts holding that
proceedings to terminate parental rights may constitute a public service,
program, or activity under the ADA. 31 While there are significant
differences between child welfare and guardianship proceedings, to the
extent that courts have found that the former proceedings are covered
by Title II, those cases will be helpful in establishing that guardianship is
a public service covered by the ADA.
Although the courts have not yet addressed the question of
whether a State’s guardianship program is covered by Title II,
that would “improperly interfere with state court proceedings.” Order Granting Defendants’
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, No. 16-07363, at 5 (2017) [hereinafter DRNY Order];
see id. at 4 (concluding that the case falls within the Sprint Communications abstention category
of “civil proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability
to perform their judicial functions” (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584,
591 (2013))). DRNY filed a notice of appeal on September 11, 2017.
29 See, e.g., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE OLMSTEAD CABINET: A
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR SERVING NEW YORKERS WITH DISABILITIES IN THE MOST
INTEGRATED SETTING 26–27 (Oct. 2013), http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/opca/pdfs/9Olmstead-Cabinet-Report101013.pdf. But see generally DRNY Order, supra note 28 (dismissing
ADA challenge to state guardianship law on abstention grounds without directly addressing the
question of whether guardianship might be a governmental activity subject to the mandates of
Title II of the ADA).
30 See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 524–29, 531–34 (2004) (determining that Congress
had the authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity to
permit federal suits to challenge state actions “implicating the fundamental right of access to
the courts”).
31 See In re Doe, 60 P.3d 285, 292–93 (Haw. 2002); Dale Margolin, No Chance to Prove
Themselves: The Rights of Mentally Disabled Parents Under the Americans with Disabilities Act
and State Law, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 112, 117 (2007) (observing that the Supreme Court has
not ruled on the applicability of Title II to proceedings to terminate parental rights and
collecting state cases).
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guardianship should fall within the ambit of the ADA’s public services
provisions based on the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of
covered governmental activity.
B.

“Qualified Individuals with Disabilities”

To establish the Title II claim, the individual challenging a
guardianship must demonstrate that she is a “qualified individual with a
disability” 32 who is eligible for supports or assistance that may be needed
to engage in personal and financial activities outside of the guardianship
construct. 33 To effectively oppose any potential opposition on this
element of the Title II claim, advocates must be prepared to
demonstrate that individuals with cognitive limitations can function
outside the guardianship construct with adequate supports. Advocates
faced a similar challenge in the early deinstitutionalization litigation. At
that time, institutionalization was seen as the proper way to “treat” and
care for individuals with severe disabilities. Consequently, it was
necessary to educate many to understand that life in the community was
possible with sufficient supports, and in fact much more therapeutic and
humane. Similarly, advocates now are engaged in a process to get the
relevant actors to understand that guardianship must no longer be seen
as the only or the best tool for assisting individuals with significant
cognitive limitations. 34 The lessons gained from existing pilot projects,
current research, and the experience of individuals using support as an
alternative to guardianship under existing state laws will be critical to
demonstrating that individuals can succeed and flourish with supports
and do not need guardians. 35 The experience of individuals using
32 A “qualified individual with a disability” is someone who “with or without reasonable
modifications to rules, policies, or practices . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements for
the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.”
42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2012).
33 A very significant number of individuals with limitations in cognitive abilities affecting
self-care and financial management should be able to meet this standard. See, e.g., McGary v.
City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1264–65, 1269–70 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that a man with
AIDS needing additional time to clean his yard to comply with the city’s nuisance abatement
law was a qualified individual with a disability who could assert a Title II ADA claim); see also
Williams v. Wasserman, 164 F. Supp. 2d 591, 629–31 (D. Md. 2001) (finding plaintiffs in
deinstitutionalization litigation were “qualified individuals with disabilities” despite the fact
that existing community placements were not sufficient to meet the plaintiffs’ needs).
34 See ABA Resolution 113, supra note 16; UGCOPAA, supra note 16, at § 102(13)
(including supported decision making in definition of less restrictive alternative); id. at
§ 102(31) (defining “Supported decision making”); id. at § 301 (requiring clear and convincing
evidence that physical health, safety or self-care needs cannot be met with supported decision
making).
35 As various pilot projects move forward and analyze the results, we will begin to have a
body of information about how to design and carry out effective mechanisms for decisionmaking support. See, e.g., Pell, Pilot Program Evaluation, supra note 15. Supported Decision-
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support to make decisions can also help demonstrate the many benefits
that come from the individual’s exercise of autonomy and her greater
integration in social and civic activities. It will also be useful to develop a
cadre of professionals who understand the ways to support decisionmaking outside guardianship to serve as allies in this political and legal
effort.
C. Is the Integration Mandate Properly Applied to the Experience
of Individuals Living in the Community If They Are Not at Real Risk of
Institutionalization?
Since the decision in Olmstead, advocates have been quite
successful in persuading courts that the integration mandate should be
broadly construed to achieve meaningful integration of individuals with
disabilities. 36 There has been steady progress in the judicial recognition
that the integration mandate prohibits not just institutionalization but a
wide range of practices that isolate individuals with disabilities.
In Olmstead, which involved confinement in a state mental
institution, the Court concluded that unnecessary institutional
confinement could violate the integration mandate. 37 After Olmstead,
courts found that the integration mandate applied to challenges by
individuals living outside of institutions seeking services in the
community to avoid the risk of institutionalization. 38 Now we have
Making New York (SDMNY) recently began a five-year pilot to design and implement a
program to divert individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities (I/DD) from
guardianship and to restore the rights of individuals with I/DD who had been subjected to
guardianship. For a full description of SDMNY’s project, goals and news see Education,
SDMNY [hereinafter SDMNY], http://sdmny.org/about-sdmny/our-goals/education (last
visited Oct. 2, 2017). Professor Christine Bigby at La Trobe University in Australia is currently
researching what “processes work best for providing support for decisions making, including
what kind of training and education works for people who are supporting others to make
decisions.” For discussion of the research project, see Effective Decision-Making Support, LA
TROBE UNIVERSITY, http://www.latrobe.edu.au/lids/research/support-for-decision-making/
decision-making-support (last visited Oct. 2, 2017). See generally Nina Kohn et al., Supported
Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1111 (2013)
(noting the need for further research on the efficacy of supported decision-making processes).
36 See, e.g., Bagenstos, The ADA at 25, supra note 21, at 17 (discussing how post-Olmstead
efforts have sought full and equal participation in “all of the key arenas of everyday life, from
[work to] attending court and other government proceedings, to patronizing stores and
businesses, to recreational activities like going to the movies or the ball game, patronizing
casinos, or going on a cruise”).
37 See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999) (observing that case raises
the question “whether the [ADA’s] proscription of discrimination may require placement of
persons with mental disabilities in community settings rather than in institutions”).
38 See Davis v. Shah, 821 F.3d 231, 259–64 (2d Cir. 2016) (concluding that policy causing
risk of institutionalization and unnecessary isolation supports an integration mandate claim);
Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 321–22 (4th Cir. 2013); M.R. v. Dreyfus, 663 F.3d 1100, 1118 (9th
Cir. 2011), amended by 697 F.3d 706 (9th Cir. 2012); Radaszewski ex rel. Radaszewski v.
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decisions that have applied the integration mandate in contexts where
there is no demonstrated risk of institutionalization or any question of
institutionalization in the particular context. 39 In these cases, the courts
have recognized, consistent with the Justice Department’s guidance, that
the most integrated setting is the setting that provides an individual with
disabilities the greatest opportunity for interaction with other people
who do not have disabilities. 40
And this progression in the case law has allowed integration
mandate challenges to go forward in challenges to placements in
community-based adult homes 41 and to segregation of individuals with
disabilities in community-based sheltered employment and day
Maram, 383 F.3d 599, 609 (7th Cir. 2004); Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175,
1181 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding that “there is nothing in the plain language of the regulations
that limits protection to persons who are currently institutionalized”); Townsend v. Quasim,
328 F.3d 511, 517–18 (9th Cir. 2003); Hiltibran v. Levy, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115–16 (W.D.
Mo. 2011) (finding that the State Medicaid program’s provision of adult diapers only to persons
living in institutions places beneficiaries living in the community at risk of institutionalization
in violation of the integration mandate). One can argue that guardianship may actually increase
the risk of institutionalization. Anecdotal evidence suggests that individuals subject to
guardianship may be at greater risk of institutionalization than those without guardians either
because the guardians may be more likely to select institutional settings for their “wards” than
the individuals would themselves or because the potential anti-therapeutic nature of
guardianship causes functional deterioration that might lead to institutionalization. See, e.g.,
Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship, supra note 17, at 207 n.164.
39 See, e.g., Steimel v. Wernert, 823 F.3d 902, 910–14, 918 (7th Cir. 2016); Guggenberger v.
Minnesota, 198 F. Supp. 3d 973 (D. Minn. 2016); Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199,
1202–06 (D. Or. 2012); Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 224–27
(E.D.N.Y. 2009); Lovely H. v. Eggleston, 235 F.R.D. 248, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); K.M. v. Hyde, 381
F. Supp. 2d 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
40 States “shall administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting
appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2016).
The regulations’ preamble defines “the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of
qualified individuals with disabilities” as “a setting that enables individuals with disabilities to
interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible.” 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. B. The
DOJ issued a guidance statement in 2011 reiterating this same conclusion. Statement of the
Dep’t of Justice on the Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and
Olmstead v. L.C., U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (June 22, 2011), https://www.ada.gov/olmstead/q&a_
olmstead.pdf. The DOJ notes that “[i]ntegrated settings are located in mainstream society” and
“offer access to community activities and opportunities at times, frequencies and with persons
of an individual’s choosing; afford individuals choice in their daily life activities; and, provide
individuals with disabilities the opportunity to interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest
extent possible.” Id. The Guidance notes that a state might violate the integration mandate if it
“operates . . . programs that segregate individuals with disabilities” or “through its planning,
service system design, funding choices, or service implementation practices, promotes or relies
upon the segregation of individuals with disabilities in private facilities or programs.” Id. The
Justice Department explicitly notes that the mandate applies outside of institutions or other
segregated settings. Id.
41 See Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 224–27 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
(noting that supported housing may provide greater opportunities for interactions with nondisabled persons than adult homes and concluding that supported housing would be a more
integrated setting than an adult home within the meaning of the integration mandate); see also
Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship, supra note 17, at 206–09.

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

534

[Vol. 39:521

programs. 42 More recently, courts have found that state Medicaid
policies that reduced the ability of recipients to leave their homes with
assistance from their home attendants potentially violated the
integration mandate. 43 In reaching that conclusion in Steimel v.
Wernert, the Seventh Circuit explained: “Given the integration
mandate’s maximalist language . . . [it] logically applies to all settings,
not just to institutional settings [and] bars unjustified segregation of
persons with disabilities, wherever it takes place.” 44
The courts have been increasingly liberal in finding integration
mandate violations, and the conclusion that guardianship violates this
mandate is a logical next step in this progression towards full
integration under the ADA. Whether the courts are ready for such a
challenge now, or in four years or in a decade, it is a concept whose time
will come eventually. Because guardianship can be an extremely
isolating mechanism that is often imposed without due consideration of
its isolating effects, it is important to challenge guardianship as a
violation of the ADA’s integration mandate.
D.

Remaining Hurdles in Olmstead Challenges to Guardianship

There are two final hurdles to an Olmstead challenge to
guardianship. The first is the possible defense that the plaintiff is seeking
new services (or a new level of services) that the State does not provide
to anyone, rather than requesting that currently available services be
provided in a more integrated manner or setting. 45 The second
42 See Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1202–06 (D. Or. 2012); see also Olmstead
Enforcement, ADA.GOV, http://www.ada.gov/olmstead/olmstead_enforcement.htm (last visited
July 23, 2017) (discussing DOJ settlements in Olmstead litigation and investigations including,
e.g., U.S. v. Rhode Island, 14-175 (D.R.I. 2014) (prohibiting unnecessary isolation in sheltered
workshops and facility-based day programs for individuals living in the community)).
43 See Steimel v. Wernert, 823 F.3d 902, 910–14, 918 (7th Cir. 2016) (concluding that
restructuring of State Medicaid waiver program that reduced the time an individual could
spend with her home attendant outside of her home may violate the integration mandate
because it reduces interactions with individuals without disabilities even where there is no risk
of institutionalization); Guggenberger v. Minnesota, 198 F. Supp. 3d 973 (D. Minn. 2016)
(concluding that State’s denial of Medicaid waiver services that would enable plaintiffs to go out
of their homes and interact with others in community may violate integration mandate); see
also Lovely H. v. Eggleston, 235 F.R.D. 248, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that requiring
individuals with disabilities to use three welfare hub stations that are difficult for them to reach,
rather than the local welfare offices more accessible to their homes, likely constitutes unjustified
segregation in violation of the ADA’s integration mandate); K.M. v. Hyde, 381 F. Supp. 2d 343
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding unnecessary social isolation of a student with disabilities during his
school lunch hour is actionable disability-based discrimination).
44 Steimel, 823 F.3d at 911.
45 This argument comes from a footnote in Olmstead noting that while the ADA prohibited
states from discriminating with respect to services that the state “in fact, provide[s],” states
were not required to “provide a certain level of benefits to individuals with disabilities.”
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remaining hurdle is the likely State affirmative defense that providing
the requested alternative to guardianship would cause a fundamental
program alteration. 46
Courts have understood that services provided in an integrated
setting may not look exactly as they did in the segregated setting and
have rejected the State’s “new services” defense based on the argument
that the integrated services are “different” from the segregated form of
those services. 47 Nevertheless, the new services argument continues to
be a defense that advocates must be prepared to address. For example,
although the court in Lane v. Kitzhaber found that the State violated the
integration mandate by providing sheltered, rather than supported,
employment services, and could be ordered to provide significant
community-based supported employment services, the court would not
direct the State to provide certain new services that the State did not
provide to anyone. 48 Despite the court’s line drawing in Lane v.
Kitzhaber, the plaintiffs nevertheless were able to use the integration
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 603 n.14 (1999) (responding to Justice Thomas’s
dissent based on the Court’s limitation in Alexander v. Choate on the right of people with
disabilities to meaningful access to health care under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act). See
generally Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers, Debilitating Alexander v. Choate:
“Meaningful Access” to Health Care for People with Disabilities, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 447,
451–52 (2008) (distinguishing the respective purposes of Section 504 and the ADA and arguing
that the “meaningful access” limitation set out in Choate is less appropriate when addressing
claims under the ADA, which is a broad civil rights act); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of
Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 45–50 (2004) (observing that the Court’s access/content
distinction in ADA claims seeking accommodations or program modifications is false and
inconsistent with the ADA’s goal of full integration).
46 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2016) (requiring public entities to make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices or procedures to avoid disability-based discrimination,
unless those modifications would “fundamentally alter” the service, program or activity at
issue).
47 See, e.g., Radaszewski v. Maram, 383 F.3d 599, 609–11 (7th Cir. 2004); Salzman,
Rethinking Guardianship, supra note 17, at 212 n.174 (citing cases).
48 In Lane v. Kitzhaber, the district court found that plaintiffs stated an integration mandate
claim challenging defendants’ allocation of available resources in a way that unjustifiably
favored segregated employment in sheltered workshops at the expense of providing supported
employment services to qualified individuals and that defendants could be required to provide
supported employment services to those individuals who qualify for and are interested in them.
Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1206–08 (D. Or. 2012). However, the court rejected
plaintiffs’ claim that defendants must “offer an adequate array of integrated employment and
supported employment services” and “provide . . . support[ed] employment services that would
enable [plaintiffs] to work in integrated employment settings,” because the court viewed this as
an impermissible effort to establish a “certain standard of care or level of benefits.” Id. at 1208.
The court distinguished these services from the employment services for which they are
currently eligible in a less segregated setting than sheltered workshops. Id. at 1206–08. See
generally Davis v. Shah, 821 F.3d 231, 264 (2d Cir. 2016) (concluding that challenged policy
explicitly excluded individuals with certain disabilities but stating in dicta that “although the
ADA cannot and does not ‘require[ ] States to provide a certain level of benefits to individuals
with disabilities,’ it can and does require states to ‘adhere to the ADA’s nondiscrimination
requirement with regard to the services they in fact provide’” (quoting Olmstead, 527 U.S. at
603 n.14 (1999))).
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mandate to successfully shift services from a segregated to an integrated
setting.
In the guardianship context, when arguing that the State should be
required to provide the “services” of guardianship in a more integrated
manner, advocates may have to confront a new services defense. This
hurdle should not be insurmountable. Most states have public
guardianship programs, and there would be a compelling argument that
the services currently provided by the public guardian must be provided
in a more integrated manner outside guardianship. Further, there are
currently many services provided by states that help individuals manage
their personal and property affairs including, Medicaid home and
community-based waiver services, mental health and developmental
disabilities services, and person-centered supports, supported housing,
recovery-based services, community support networks, case
management services, assertive community treatment, crisis
management assistance, personal assistance, and independent living
services. Advocates can point to this range of community-based services
and supports currently provided by the State that could provide the
assistance with personal and financial management that is currently
provided in the guardianship construct. 49 Thus, there are legal and
factual ways to overcome any potential new services roadblock to an
integration mandate challenge to the unnecessary isolation of
individuals in the guardianship setting. The real challenge for advocates
will be to avoid a new services defense while trying to bring meaningful
changes to the way our society assists individuals in making decisions
and caring for their own personal and financial needs.
Finally, because the State need not provide services in the most
integrated setting if doing so would entail a fundamental program
alteration, this affirmative defense will continue to provide a litigation
challenge to individuals seeking more integrated services that the State
perceives to be administratively or financially burdensome. 50 In
Olmstead, the Supreme Court reiterated this limitation on the State’s
obligation to provide accommodations 51 but did not set out a clear
standard for establishing a fundamental program alteration. 52 Courts
49 See generally Olmstead Enforcement, ADA.gov, https://www.ada.gov/olmstead/olmstead_
cases_list2.htm#marion (last visited Sept. 19, 2017) (requiring provision of assertive community
treatment teams, community support teams, intensive case management teams, case
management service providers, crisis services centers, mobile crisis teams, a crisis hotline,
supported housing, supported employment, and peer support services).
50 See Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship, supra note 17, at 220–31. See generally Bagenstos,
Deinstitutionalization Litigation, supra note 14 (discussing the economics of
deinstitutionalization and the challenges of obtaining community-based services in difficult
economic times).
51 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603.
52 For a fuller explanation of this defense, see Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship, supra
note 17, at 220–31.
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understand that integration will almost always involve substantial shortterm burdens, both financial and administrative, and cost alone will not
establish a fundamental alteration defense. 53 We know that courts will
require a State to demonstrate that the requested program modification
actually interferes with the State’s ability to provide services to others
with disabilities. 54 At the same time, the Olmstead Court concluded that
a State could meet the fundamental alteration defense by demonstrating
that it has “a comprehensive, effectively working plan for . . . [the
integration of individuals] with . . . disabilities . . . and a waiting list that
move[s] at a reasonable pace not controlled by the State’s endeavors to
keep its institutions fully populated . . . .” 55 Courts addressing
fundamental alteration defenses after Olmstead have required that the
State have a comprehensive, concrete, and viable integration plan for
placing eligible individuals in community-based programs by a target
date that is sufficiently specific for a court to review the adequacy of the
State’s ongoing “commitment to action.” 56
Although the cases that have addressed the fundamental alteration
defense have not been entirely consistent in their analyses, to succeed on
a fundamental alteration defense, the State must demonstrate—
specifically and concretely—that the administrative and financial costs
of providing supported decision-making options would prevent the
State from providing assistance with decision-making to other
individuals with diminished mental abilities. This will not be easy for
the State to prove. A State could also try to show that it has a
“comprehensive, effectively working plan” to move individuals from
guardianship to the status of exercising legal capacity, with or without
support. States are moving forward in developing and making available
the types of supports that some individuals with cognitive limitations
might need and desire to make decisions and manage their personal and
financial needs, but it is unlikely that any State could demonstrate that it
currently has a “comprehensive and effectively working plan” moving
individuals out of guardianship. By the time they can, we may be well on
our way to the recognition of universal legal capacity.

See Fisher v. Oklahoma Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175, 1183 (10th Cir. 2003).
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603–04.
55 Id. at 605–06.
56 Pa. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Pa. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 402 F.3d 374, 382–83 (3d Cir.
2005); Disability Advocates Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 267–69, 305 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
53
54

538

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:521

II. USING SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS TO CHALLENGE OR LIMIT
GUARDIANSHIP
The integration mandate claim is particularly appealing because it
holds the promise of expanding community-based services and supports
for individuals with disabilities so they may successfully direct their own
lives. 57 While I recognize that our substantive due process jurisprudence
remains highly contested and has its limitations with regard to the range
of potential relief, it is worth considering the ways in which the doctrine
might be used to challenge guardianship or limit its scope. 58 Such an
analysis seems particularly appropriate in a Symposium dedicated to the
personhood of individuals with disabilities. 59
Why bother going down this road? Why reach for an elusive
doctrine that continues to be the subject of significant scholarly
debate? 60 Substantive due process doctrine seeks to define those rights

57 The appropriate remedy in an integration mandate case is for the State to provide the
services at issue in a less restrictive manner or setting. Thus, litigation under the Olmstead
doctrine holds greater promise for the provision of supports and services in a less restrictive
setting, than does constitutional litigation that asserts the right to be free of guardianship. By
way of comparison, in the deinstitutionalization context, statutory discrimination theories
ultimately proved more promising than the constitutional due process theories used by
advocates in the earlier deinstitutionalization litigation. See Bagenstos, Deinstitutionalization
Litigation, supra note 14, at 6 (noting that the “anti-discrimination theory relying on the ADA
and Olmstead . . . focuses directly on state resource-allocation decisions and, far more than due
process, affords states a powerful incentive to create and fund adequate community services”);
see also discussion supra Part I.
58 Pursuit of such a constitutional claim would admittedly run counter to the wisdom of
most disability advocates to strategically avoid pursuing constitutional claims on behalf of their
clients. See Michael E. Waterstone, Michael Ashley Stein & David B. Wilkins, Disability Cause
Lawyers, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1287, 1317 (2012) (“A poll [of disability lawyers] showed a
near-uniform consensus among [them] that constitutional litigation was not a priority or even
a significant item on the litigation agenda.”). But see DRNY Complaint, supra note 28 (raising
substantive and procedural due process claims, along with statutory claims in a challenge to
New York’s plenary guardianship law for individuals with intellectual and developmental
disabilities). This case was recently dismissed in its entirety on abstention grounds. See DRNY
Order, supra note 28, at 5.
59 See Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law, supra note 5, at 556–57 (urging disability
advocates to consider using constitutional theories to underscore the profound history of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities and ultimately achieve “a more progressive
vision of society” than is possible by relying on statutory theories alone).
60 The contours and basis of substantive due process is the subject of much scholarly debate
and is beyond the scope of this essay. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process
After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1531–32 (2008); Daniel O. Conkle, Three
Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63 (2006) (discussing the theories of
substantive due process: “historical tradition,” “reasoned judgment,” and “evolving national
values”); James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins
of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 320–27 (1999) Ryan C. Williams, The
One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408 (2010) (discussing debate over
the basis for substantive due process).
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and liberties that define us as citizens under our founding document 61; it
protects those important liberty interests that allow us to express our
humanity and our personhood. By forcing the courts to struggle with
the constitutional dimensions of disability rights, we have an
opportunity for more robust engagement with issues of importance to
individuals with disabilities. 62
Persons with cognitive limitations have often been excluded from
recognition as full legal persons, and that is done, at least in part,
through guardianship. It is true that, as articulated in Olmstead, the
integration mandate at its heart rests on an essential right to participate
as a full person, and its use may help reverse the exclusion and
segregation of guardianship. Nonetheless, statutory recognition of
personhood would be reinforced and substantiated by the recognition of
a substantive due process liberty interest in the exercise of legal capacity.
By claiming a substantive due process right to make those decisions
central to one’s identity, advocates would keep the recognition of full
citizenship and personhood in a place of prominence in the
guardianship debate.
Although the Supreme Court has generally cautioned courts about
finding new constitutionally protected liberty interests, 63 in its 2015
decision in Obergefell, the Court recognized the judicial obligation to
identify and protect fundamental rights and correct injustices that may
not be immediately apparent “in our own times.” 64 Writing for the
majority, Justice Kennedy explained that when identifying
constitutionally protected liberty interests courts should employ
reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so
fundamental that the State must accord them its respect . . . . History
and tradition guide and discipline the inquiry but do not set its outer
boundaries. [This] method respects our history and learns from it
without allowing the past alone to rule the present. 65

This Part will set forth three ways in which substantive due process
may be implicated in guardianship and how it might be used to limit the
incidence or scope of guardianship. The first relates to the nature and
duration of guardianship. Substantive due process limits the scope and
See Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law, supra note 5.
See Waterstone, Backlash, supra note 4, at 843 (noting that “one consequence [of
avoiding Supreme Court litigation and constitutional challenges more generally in disability
cases] is that the opportunity for backlash against judicial decisions, pushing the frontiers of
disability rights beyond where the public is willing to take them, has been minimized”).
63 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (stating that courts must
exercise caution in finding new constitutionally protected liberty interests lest we “subtly
transform” the Due Process Clause into little more than a statement of judicial policy
preferences).
64 See Obergefell v. Hodges 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
65 Id. (citation omitted).
61
62
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duration of a restriction on liberty to that reasonably related to the
purpose for which it is imposed. The second relates to the State’s
obligation to the individual when it imposes guardianship on the
individual and removes the individual’s ability to act on her own. Under
such circumstances, substantive due process requires the State to
provide the individual subject to guardianship with some level of
treatment to restore her decision-making abilities and self-care skills.
Finally, carrying the substantive due process analysis in Obergefell
v. Hodges one step further, I suggest that one day the Court will
recognize a liberty interest in making one’s own decisions and charting
one’s destiny and will conclude that substantive due process precludes
restrictions on the exercise of legal capacity. Both the analytic
methodology used by the Court (historic tradition plus evolving
standards) and the statements in dicta recognizing the centrality of
personal choices to autonomy and dignity 66 provide a sliver of hope that
one day the Court might find a fundamental right or liberty interest in
the exercise of legal capacity.
A.

Nature and Duration of Guardianship: Jackson v. Indiana and
Youngberg v. Romeo

Substantive due process principles set out in Jackson v. Indiana and
Youngberg v. Romeo67 can help us think more critically about the nature
and duration of guardianship and reinforce the requirement of many
state laws to specifically limit the scope of guardianship to the
individual’s need for assistance. Substantive due process also can impose
an ongoing obligation on the State to provide the individual subject to
guardianship with some training and skill development to gain or regain the ability to exercise legal capacity on her own behalf.
1.

Scope of Order Must Bear Some Reasonable Relationship to
Its Purpose

The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that institutional
confinement constitutes a “massive curtailment of liberty” and that this
limitation on the individual’s liberty represents more than just the loss
of physical freedom. 68 The recognition that civil commitment infringes
Id. at 2589.
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). See
generally Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 524–25 (2004) (reaffirming the viability of the
Court’s decisions in Jackson and Youngberg).
68 Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980) (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509
(1972)); see Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 79 (1992). Although some more recent decisions
66
67
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on liberty interests beyond the restrictions on physical freedom inherent
in institutionalization supports the analogy between civil commitment
and guardianship.
In Jackson v. Indiana, an individual found incompetent to stand
trial on criminal charges challenged his indefinite commitment to a
state mental facility. The Supreme Court concluded that the State could
not hold the man indefinitely when the evidence indicated that he
would not regain the competence to stand trial, declaring that “due
process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed.”69
Ten years later, when the Court had the opportunity to further
elaborate on the constitutional limits on involuntary commitment in
Youngberg v. Romeo, it concluded that substantive due process requires
the State to provide an involuntarily committed person with reasonably
safe and non-restrictive conditions of confinement. 70 Together Jackson
and Youngberg require that involuntary commitment be reasonably
related to its purpose and provide reasonably non-restrictive conditions
of confinement. 71 Because guardianship, particularly plenary
guardianship, constitutes a restraint on liberty analogous to that of civil
commitment, under the dictates of Jackson and Youngberg,
guardianship’s restrictions may be justified only to the extent they are
reasonably non-restrictive and proportionate to the need for decisionmaking assistance the allegedly incapacitated person requires.
The question is whether the restrictions on liberty in guardianship
are sufficiently similar to those presented by institutional confinement
in cases involving institutionalization tie the relevant due process liberty interest more
specifically to the freedom from bodily restraint, see, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 445
(2011) (citing Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80), that discussion is appropriately limited to the
circumstances of those cases and should do not detract from the Court’s recognition in Foucha
and Vitek that institutionalization restricts a broad range of liberty interests.
69 Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738.
70 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315–16 (challenging institutional conditions in developmental
disabilities center to which young man was involuntarily committed).
71 The Supreme Court, however, has never found a constitutional right to conditions of
confinement that are the least restrictive of the individual’s liberty. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin,
“Their Promises of Paradise”: Will Olmstead v. L.C. Resuscitate the Constitutional “Least
Restrictive Alternative” Principle in Mental Disability Law?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 999, 1040–44
(2000) [hereinafter Perlin, Promises of Paradise]; Bagenstos, Deinstitutionalization Litigation,
supra note 14, at 24–25. While most state civil commitment statutes require consideration of
whether institutionalization would be the least restrictive alternative for the individual, see Ingo
Keilitz et al., Least Restrictive Treatment of Involuntary Patients: Translating Concepts into
Practice, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691, 709–10 n.101 (1985) (listing statutes in thirty-nine states that,
as of 1985, required courts to consider alternatives to hospitalization at time of involuntary civil
commitment proceeding), the courts have not vigorously enforced this statutory requirement
and have not effectively diverted individuals to community-based settings or required
development of community-based alternatives. See Perlin, Promises of Paradise, supra note 71,
at 1054.
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to draw the parallel between these contexts for substantive due process
purposes. At least in part because guardianship is a creature of state law,
the Supreme Court has never been asked to determine whether
guardianship restricts fundamental liberty interests or consider what
limitations substantive due process may impose on guardianship orders.
In Olmstead, Justice Ginsberg provides at least indirect support for the
involuntary civil commitment/guardianship analogy. In Olmstead, the
Justice highlighted the ways in which the restrictions of
institutionalization go beyond the restraint on physical freedom,
observing that institutionalization also impacts “family relations, social
contacts, work options, economic independence, educational
advancement, and cultural enrichment.” 72 Most of these cited
deprivations impact liberty interests protected by substantive due
process, and are restrictions that often flow from broad guardianship
orders. 73 Such orders can divest the individual of the ability to
determine where she lives, what medical treatment she receives, who she
can associate with, whether and where she works, and whether and how
she can manage her finances. These limitations are the same as those
that Justice Ginsberg cited as flowing from institutionalization.
High state courts, however, have addressed the substantive due
process implications of guardianship. In the latter 1980s and 1990s,
several state courts of last resort concluded that guardianship
represented such a substantial intrusion on individual liberty that it
resembled the loss of liberty flowing from involuntary civil
commitment. 74 Recognizing the significant loss of liberty inherent in
guardianship, these high state courts concluded that States could impose
a guardianship only to the extent it could demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that there were no less restrictive arrangements to
assist an individual with decision-making in those areas of functioning
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 601 (1999).
See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923); State ex rel. Shamblin v. Collier, 445 S.E.2d 736, 739 (W. Va. 1994) (finding that the
declaration of incompetency and guardianship appointment “may affect constitutionallyguaranteed liberty interests . . . [including] the right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief
for, unjustified intrusions on personal security,” the right to travel, to decide where to live, to
conduct one’s personal and business affairs, and to establish one’s legal relationship with
others); In re Guardianship of Deere, 708 P.2d 1123, 1125–26 (Okla. 1985) (concluding that
guardianship represents a “massive curtailment of liberty” and implicates historically
recognized liberties including the right to practice a profession, marry, refuse medical
treatment, possess a driver’s license, and vote); In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1089–91 (Utah 1981)
(recognizing guardianship order causes significant loss of personal liberty and infringement on
right to self-determination and right of privacy, right to travel, and the right to make medical
decisions).
74 In re Guardianship of Reyes, 731 P.2d 130, 131 (Ariz. 1986); In re Hedin, 528 N.W.2d 567
(Iowa 1995); In re Braaten, 502 N.W.2d 512 (N.D. 1993); In re M.R., 638 A.2d 1274, 1282 (N.J.
1994); Deere, 708 P.2d at 1125–26.; In re Peery, 727 A.2d 539 (Pa. 1999); Shamblin, 445 S.E.2d
at 739; Boyer, 636 P.2d at 1089–91.
72
73
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in which the individual needed assistance. 75
These judicially recognized substantive limitations, along with the
procedural due process rights that also flow from the liberty interests
implicated by guardianship, 76 have most likely resulted in the
imposition of fewer guardianships, with some guardianship orders that
are limited in scope. Yet, despite these expansive state court decisions
finding that guardianship implicates important liberty interests in ways
similar to involuntary commitment, and despite the statutory language
of many state guardianship statutes requiring that guardianship orders
be carefully tailored so that they are the least restrictive of individual
liberty, state guardianship regimes have not been dramatically altered.
The evidence indicates that guardianship orders continue to be entered
when they are not needed and are rarely limited in scope. 77
Thus, the question is whether the effort to use Jackson and
Youngberg’s substantive due process limitations requiring
proportionality between the purpose of the State’s intervention and the
restrictions on individual liberty, along with the requirement of
reasonably non-restrictive conditions of confinement will lead to more
meaningful reform of guardianship than we have seen to date, and get
us closer to the recognition of universal legal capacity. Even if the efforts
are not immediately successful, however, it seems worth continuing to
remind the courts that guardianship restricts fundamental liberties in
violation of substantive due process. Certainly, the argument is critical
75 In re Estate of Early, 673 P.2d 209, 215 (Cal. 1983) (holding that court must consider
evidence that third-party assistance is available to meet basic needs of proposed conservatee);
In re Estate of McPeak, 386 N.E.2d 957, 960 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (recognizing that alleged
incompetent person should have right to demonstrate that he can meet his needs “through
whatever device is reasonably available under the circumstances”); Hedin, 528 N.W.2d at 578–
79 (requiring consideration of available third party assistance to meet an alleged incapacitated
ward’s needs); Braaten, 502 N.W.2d at 515, 520–21 (requiring heightened standards of
decision-making comparable to that provided in involuntary commitment and prohibiting
plenary guardianship); Shamblin, 445 S.E.2d at 739 (finding that court must scrutinize state’s
determination of incompetency and consider less restrictive means of assistance). It is,
however, discouraging to note that for decades many state laws and the Uniform Guardianship
and Protective Proceedings Act have explicitly required consideration of less restrictive
alternatives to guardianship. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 81.01(a)(2) (McKinney 2006); see
also David M. English, Amending the UGPPA to Implement the 3rd National Guardianship
Summit, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION 9–10 (2015), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/
Guardianship%20and%20Protective%20Proceedings/2015apr_Amending%20UFPPA%20to%
20Impl.%20Third%20Nat'l%20Guardianship%20Summit_English.pdf
(discussing
1997
uniform law).
76 State courts have declared that because the appointment of a guardian infringes on
multiple liberty interests, the state must provide “the full panoply of procedural due process
rights comparable to those present in involuntary civil commitment proceedings.” Hedin, 528
N.W.2d at 575; see also Shamblin, 445 S.E.2d at 740–41. See generally Deere, 708 P.2d at 1125–
26 (finding due process requires written notice and opportunity to be heard before state may
deprive individual of the “right to personal freedom”).
77 See Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship, supra note 17, at 174–75; Salzman, Guardianship
for Persons with Mental Illness, supra note 17, at 295–96.
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in challenging the remaining plenary guardianship laws. 78
The push in this direction seems important for the rights of
individuals with limitations in cognitive abilities. 79 The hope is that by
continuing to assert constitutional limits on the scope of guardianship,
advocates will force guardianship courts to take the restrictions imposed
by guardianship more seriously. In more recent guardianship cases in
our State of New York, courts have grappled with the deprivation of
liberty interests in guardianship and, in some courageous decisions,
have been willing to deny petitions in favor of alternatives that permit
the individual to exercise legal capacity, with support if needed. 80
2.

The Obligation To Provide Training and Skills Development
and To Limit the Duration of Guardianship

Two particularly disturbing aspects of guardianship orders are that:
(1) they do not come with a mandate to train or habilitate the individual
found to be incapacitated; and (2) they are usually of unlimited
duration, with little-to-nothing in the way of meaningful periodic
review of any continuing need for guardianship. 81 It would be fair to say
that as a matter of reality, in states throughout the nation, once we have
a guardianship proceeding and a guardian is appointed, we say to
ourselves: “great, we have taken care of that problem—that person is
now protected. Goal is achieved, case is closed.” 82 But guardianships of
78 We had hoped to learn about the viability of a federal substantive due process challenge
to New York’s plenary guardianship law for persons with intellectual and developmental
disabilities. See DRNY Complaint, supra note 28 (raising a claim under Jackson that the
guardianship court must use a least restrictive alternative standard and carefully tailor its
orders). The District Court, however, dismissed the complaint on abstention grounds. See
DRNY Order, supra note 28, at 4–5. The plaintiff has filed a notice of appeal, so we may yet
have federal guidance on this issue.
79 See Waterstone, Backlash, supra note 4, at 848 (arguing in favor of applying sufficient
pressure on courts to make them partners in the effort to “[marshal] in a new era of disability
equality”).
80 See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2012); In
re Meir, No. 1202768822684, 2016 Sur. Ct. King’s Cnty. NYLJ, at *1 (Sur. Ct. King’s Cty. Sept.
21, 2016); Guardianship of Sean O., 2016 NYLJ LEXIS 3455, at *11–12 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2016)
(guardian denied); In re D.D., 19 N.Y.S.3d 867 (Sur. Ct. King’s Cty. 2016); In re Michelle M., 41
N.Y.S.3d 719 (Sur. Ct. King’s Cty. 2016) (denying guardianship petition finding that decision
making support arrangement was least restrictive alternative).
81 See, e.g., Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship, supra note 17, at 175–76 n.54, 55; Salzman,
Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness, supra note 17, at 296–97, 305.
82 Many will argue that this is completely appropriate in cases where a person has chronic,
mid-late stage Alzheimer’s or other severe and chronic dementia. But see Rebekah Diller, Legal
Capacity for All: What the Shift from Adult Guardianship to Supported Decision-Making Has To
Offer Older Adults, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (on file with author) (citations
omitted) (citing social science research finding that older adults with chronic illness and
disabilities can (often with assistance) learn to optimize their remaining abilities to compensate
for those that have been lost).
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unlimited duration with no requirement for training or skills
development tremendously undervalue human potential and conflict
with two constitutional imperatives from the institutional commitment
context. First, that once the State assumes control over the individual
and removes her ability to care for herself, it has an obligation to
provide some modicum of training. Second, that involuntary, Stateimposed restrictions on liberty must be limited in duration.
a. Training and Skills Development
As noted in Section II.A.1, Youngberg gave the Supreme Court the
opportunity to further define the minimal level of institutional care
mandated by substantive due process. In addition to finding the liberty
interest in reasonably safe and non-restrictive conditions of involuntary
confinement discussed above, the Court concluded that substantive due
process also requires the State to provide minimally adequate
habilitation sufficient to ensure safety and freedom from restraints. 83 It
is this constitutional requirement for habilitation and training during
involuntary state confinement that provides a promising analogue to the
guardianship context.
The Court in Youngberg tied the required level of training to that
needed to keep the person safe and free of restraints, but there is some
room for debate about the exact parameters of the training mandate. 84
In a thoughtful analysis of the level of training demanded by the
Supreme Court in Youngberg, Susan Stefan notes that the right to
treatment rests on an obligation to enhance the recognized liberty
interests of the institutionalized person and may place a fairly broad
treatment obligation on the State, depending on the liberty interests
involved in the particular case. 85 Stefan notes that some courts have
adopted a broad approach to minimally adequate training for
institutionalized individuals as that “which will tend to render
unnecessary . . . prolonged isolation from one’s normal community.” 86
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315–20, 324–25 (1982).
In their concurrence in Youngberg, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and O’Connor criticize
the Court’s articulation of the required standard, suggesting that under Jackson’s
proportionality mandate, some level of treatment is required, whether it is needed to ensure
safety and freedom from undue restraint or not. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 326–30 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that the state provide the minimal training required to prevent the
deterioration of the individual’s pre-existing self-care skills). See generally United States v.
Tennessee, 615 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2010) (providing a more recent discussion of the requirement
to provide care to individuals who have been institutionalized).
85 Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the “Experts”: From Deference to Abdication Under
the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 688–89 (1992) [hereinafter Stefan,
Leaving Civil Rights].
86 Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights, supra note 85, at 688–90, n.237. While recognizing that
Youngberg has been useful to many who have been subjected to harsh institutional conditions,
scholars note that the impact of the decision has been undermined by the Court’s deference to
83
84

546

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:521

By analogy to the guardianship context, a broad reading of
Youngberg’s training obligation would support a substantive due process
argument that the State has an obligation to provide an individual
subject to guardianship with training and skills development to enhance
capabilities, reduce the restraints of guardianship, and enable the
individual to regain legal capacity. 87 From a theoretical perspective,
imposing such a requirement is completely consistent with the notion of
universal legal capacity and the obligation to limit any restrictions on its
exercise while all steps are taken to restore the person’s decision-making
abilities. 88 Whether the imposition of such a requirement within the
context of a guardianship relationship could actually help end or avoid
particular guardianships would remain to be seen. 89 The hope is that by
elevating the obligation to assist with the enhancement of the
individual’s maximum decision-making abilities to a constitutional
right, the individual subject to guardianship would be at the center of
the decision-making process, moving us closer to the recognition of
universal legal capacity.
b. Challenge to Unlimited Duration of the Guardianship Order
In the context of institutional commitment, courts have heeded the
Supreme Court’s holding in Jackson v. Indiana 90 that the duration of
professional judgment, which can be particularly problematic when the treating professional is
a state or institutional employee. Id.; Bagenstos, Deinstitutionalization Litigation, supra note 14,
at 28.
87 In guardianship, while the State does not assume physical custody over the incapacitated
person, as in the civil commitment context of Youngberg, the State guardianship order restrains
the individual’s liberty and limits her legal right to act on her own. Consequently, DeShaney
should not pose a barrier to asserting the substantive due process claim in this context. See
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (explaining that in
Youngberg the state had a constitutional obligation to the plaintiff because it assumed physical
custody and placed him in a position where he could not act on his own behalf). See generally,
Rosalie B. Levinson, Wherefore Art Thou Romeo: Revitalizing Youngberg’s Protection of Liberty
for the Civilly Committed, 54 B.C. L. REV. 535, 549–50 (2013).
88 See CRPD, supra note 1, at art. 12(3).
89 Evidence indicates that more is needed than just a change in the guardian’s legal
obligation to engage in activities to restore the capabilities of the person under guardianship.
For example, despite legislation in Florida requiring the guardian to annually report on
activities to restore the ward’s capacity and creating a specific mechanism to seek the
restoration of legal capacity, there has been little real change in practice. See FLORIDA
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES COUNCIL & GUARDIAN TRUST, RESTORATION OF CAPACITY
STUDY AND WORK GROUP REPORT (2014) [hereinafter Work Group Report], http://
www.guardianship.org/IRL/Resources/Handouts/Charting%20a%20New%20Course_
Restoration%20Report.pdf. Although this evaluation of the early impact of legislative change is
not promising, pilot projects are demonstrating real improvements in individual capabilities
when individuals in the role of guardian move from substitute decision-maker to that of true
decision-making supporter or facilitator. Id.; see, e.g., Pell, Pilot Program Evaluation, supra note
15, at 31–34 (describing how support in decision making has enhanced individual capabilities).
90 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). The Supreme Court has concluded that even if
an involuntary commitment was initially permissible on parens patriae grounds, “it could not
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commitment must bear some reasonable relationship to its purpose and
have required periodic review of the continued need for involuntary
commitment in institutions as well as long-term involuntary outpatient
treatment orders. 91 In a more recent decision by New York Surrogate
Judge Kristin Booth Glen, the court found a similar due process right to
periodic review of guardianship orders. 92 The harsh reality is that few
people who are placed under guardianship ever have their legal capacity
restored. Existing mechanisms that place the onus on the individual to
petition for termination of guardianship are simply inadequate to
appropriately limit the duration of a guardianship order. 93
Just as we should not be institutionalizing individuals indefinitely
as a matter of constitutional principle, we should not be subjecting them
to guardianships of unlimited durations. Instead, in the guardianship
context, there should be a constitutionally required mandate for
periodic review with the burden of persuasion on the person wishing to
obtain a renewed order. The benefit of this restriction may be only
theoretical—doing little more than increasing the number of
guardianship hearings, without any better or more meaningful decisions
than we have now in the first instance. Many would correctly argue that
the periodic review hearings in the involuntary commitment process are
stacked against the individual seeking release and not very meaningful.
And some would argue that periodic review hearings in the few states
that require them in the guardianship context94 are little more than
constitutionally continue after that basis no longer existed.” O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563, 575 (1975).
91 See Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986) (recognizing a liberty interest and
requirement of periodic review in cases of forced administration of psychotropic medication);
see also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.33 (McKinney 2011) (requiring judicial review of
involuntary commitment in most cases within sixty days of commitment).
92 Matter of Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419, 425–27 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2010) (citing cases and
finding a due process right to periodic review in guardianship context); see Matter of Buttonow,
23 N.Y.2d 385, 394 (1968) (concluding that as a matter of due process, a confined “mentally ill
person” has a right to “periodic review of the propriety and suitability of the confinement
before some impartial forum in which the incompetent is represented by a person or agency
wholly committed to that person’s interest”).
93 A recent ABA report found significant barriers to the restoration of rights in
guardianship. See Erica Wood, Pamela Teaster & Jenica Cassidy, Restoration of Rights in Adult
Guardianship: Research & Recommendations, AM. BAR ASS’N 37–67 (2017), https:/
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/restoration%
20report.authcheckdam.pdf.
94 Some state laws restrict the duration of guardianship orders, but set minimal
requirements for renewal. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. Code §§ 5350–72 (West 2017)
(conservatorships of persons deemed “gravely ill” that terminate in one year, unless renewed by
the court); TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1106.002–.003 (West 2015) (guardianship orders of sixteenmonth duration, renewable after filing the annual report of the person and/or annual
accounting). Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5308 (West 2000) (providing that
guardianship continues until death of guardian or ward or guardian’s incapacity, removal or
resignation), with MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5309 (West 2000) (requiring court to
evaluate the continuing need for guardianship after the first year and after the subsequent
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rubberstamps on the initial guardianship decision. 95 Nevertheless,
guardianships of unlimited duration seem only minimally
distinguishable from involuntary commitments of unlimited duration,
and the Constitution should recognize that both constitute an
impermissible restriction on basic liberty interests.
While change will likely come slowly in the guardianship context, 96
we should continue to protect the important liberty interests of those
subject to guardianship and argue that the Jackson and Youngberg
mandates that the nature and duration of a state restriction on liberty
bear some reasonable relationship to its purpose and that the State
provide some modicum of training and habilitation during the period of
involuntary commitment are properly applied in the guardianship
context.
B. Does the Court’s Decision in Obergefell v. Hodges Provide a
Substantive Due Process Path to the Recognition of Universal Legal
Capacity?
The analytic methodology used by the Court in Obergefell v.
Hodges and the Court’s focus on the importance of exercising autonomy
and making intimate decisions together provide a slim reed of hope that
the Court would one day find a fundamental liberty interest in the right
of all individuals to exercise legal capacity. In Obergefell, the Court
employed an analytic methodology that examined the historic
importance of the liberty interest of marriage in the context of evolving
national standards and opened that institution to previously excluded
same-sex couples. Rather than focusing on the long-standing tradition
of marriage as the union between persons of opposite sexes, the Court
looked more broadly at the general importance of that institution in our
historical tradition and national psyche. The Court then concluded that
three-year periods).
95 Telephone Interview with Dohn Hoyle, Dir. of Pub. Policy, The Arc Mich. (Oct. 17,
2017). Mr. Hoyle explained that Michigan law provides for partial guardianship with a
maximum duration of five years. Id.; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 330.1620, 30.1626. In his
considerable experience, however, courts rarely appoint partial guardians with orders of limited
duration, and those few time-limited guardianships are easily renewed in practice. In most
cases, the courts appoint plenary guardianships of unlimited duration. See MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 330.1618(5), 330.1626(1).
96 See Pell, Pilot Program Evaluation, supra note 15 (discussing the fact that despite a
Florida statutory requirement for the guardian to assist the individual subject to guardianship
in developing decision-making skills, review the continuing need for guardianship, and report
to the court annually, there was no evidence that any individual had her rights restored); Work
Group Report, supra note 89.
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this fundamental interest in marriage should extend to permit marriage
of same-sex couples, recognizing that the Constitution has the flexibility
to allow “future generations [to] protect . . . the right of all persons to
enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.” 97 Clearly, Obergefell represents a
dramatic evolution in the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence
and in its recognition of the rights of same-sex couples. The latter
jurisprudence has taken us from Bowers v. Hardwick, allowing States to
criminalize sodomy, 98 to Obergefell, recognizing the fundamental right
to same-sex marriage, in a period of less than thirty years. Might we
achieve similar gains over the next few decades in the recognition of
rights of persons with limitations in decision-making abilities?
With respect to evolving national standards regarding same-sex
marriage—the Court found its evidence in the national attitude reflected
in the many state laws opening marriage to same-sex couples. Although
the movement towards recognition of universal legal capacity is not as
evolved as the movement to recognize same-sex marriage was at the
time Obergefell was litigated, we are beginning to see some real social
and political recognition that individuals with mental disabilities have
the ability to make decisions for themselves (with support if necessary)
and do not need a guardian to make decisions for them. The young, but
burgeoning national movement to limit guardianship and pursue
support arrangements instead 99 may grow to one day justify such a
97 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (emphasis added). Obergefell instructs
that the “identification and protection of fundamental rights” is not a static, but rather “is an
enduring part of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution.” Id. If future courts follow its
instruction, in compelling future circumstances, courts will be required to exercise reasoned
judgment in identifying personal interests so fundamental that the State must accord them its
respect. Id.
98 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
99 Two states have now adopted laws permitting the use of supported decision-making as
an alternative to guardianship. See Supported Decision-Making Agreement Act, TEX. ESTATES
CODE ANN. § 1357 (West 2015); Supported Decision-Making Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 94A (West 2016). There are at least two significant pilot programs currently underway. See
Pell, Pilot Program Evaluation, supra note 15; SDMNY, supra note 35. In 2014, the
Administration for Community Living (ACL) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services offered a significant grant to fund a project is to create a training and technical
assistance/resource center on supported decision making. See NAT’L RESOURCE CTR. FOR
SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING, http://www.supporteddecisionmaking.org (last visited Oct. 28,
2017). In August 2017, the ABA House of Delegates adopted Resolution 113 on supported
decision making urging states to amend their guardianship statutes to consider supported
decision making as a less restrictive alternative to guardianship and a basis for the termination
of guardianship and the restoration of the individual’s rights. See ABA Resolution 113, supra
note 16; see also UGCOPAA, supra note 16, at art. 3, § 301(a)(1)(A) (providing that the
guardianship court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the individual cannot make
decisions with supportive services, technological assistance, or supported decision making). In
addition, courts have begun to terminate or deny guardianships where there is evidence that the
individual has the ability to make decisions with support. See, e.g., In re D.D., 19 N.Y.S.3d 867,
876 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2015); Guardianship of Cory C., No. BE09PO253 (Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct.,
Berkshire Cty. Dec. 7, 2015); Ross v. Hatch, No. CWF120000426P-03 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2,
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conclusion.
To benefit from the Court’s decision in Obergefell advocates of the
recognition of universal legal capacity would need to do two things.
First, they would need to get the Court to recognize a more general right
to make decisions and exercise autonomy and self-determination as a
fundamental liberty interest grounded in our national tradition. Second,
advocates would need to persuade the Court to re-calculate its
understanding of the State’s parens patriae obligation to protect
individuals needing assistance with decision-making.
With respect to the recognition of a general right to make decisions
and exercise autonomy and self-determination, one could reasonably
argue that our nation was founded on such a principle or right. The
Supreme Court, however, has never gone this far.
In dicta, the Obergefell majority repeatedly noted the importance of
exercising autonomy, making intimate choices and defining and
expressing one’s identity. 100 The Court’s language dangles the possibility
that one day the Court will recognize a fundamental right for all
individuals to make their own decisions and have those recognized by
third parties. But we are not there yet, and the Obergefell holding
ultimately rests on the right to make the specific decision to marry. 101
While both the right to same-sex marriage and the right of persons
with limitations in cognitive abilities to exercise legal capacity are
fraught social issues, there is a legal impediment to the recognition of a
substantive due process right for individuals with mental disabilities to
exercise legal capacity, however, that makes it qualitatively different
from the same-sex marriage context. The substantive component of due
process bars certain government actions, regardless of the adequacy of
the procedures used to implement them, 102 and government actions
2013); In re Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d 848, 856 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2012). Finally, the international
community has endorsed the concept of the universal right to legal capacity and the right to
support with decision making if needed. See CRPD, supra note 1.
100 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct 2584, 2597 (emphasis added) (discussing the
importance of “certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including
intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs”); id. at 2593 (finding that the
recognized liberty interest includes “certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful
realm, to define and express their identity”); id. at 2608 (observing that same-sex couples “ask
for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right”); id. at 2594
(referring to the “dignity” of same-sex couples).
101 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (finding a “right to personal choice regarding marriage”)
(emphasis added); 2608 (grounding decision in right to marry). It is important to acknowledge
that in Glucksberg, the Court declined the Respondents’ invitation to read its prior
jurisprudence to recognize a constitutionally-protected right to exercise “self-sovereignty” and
“basic and intimate exercises of personal autonomy.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
724 (1997). Instead, the Court strategically limited its holding to the question of whether there
was a fundamental liberty interest in “the right to commit suicide with another’s assistance.” Id.
102 Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125–27 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327, 331 (1986)) (distinguishing rights protected by substantive and procedural due process but
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restricting liberty interests must be “narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.” 103 In the same-sex marriage context, the
Court concluded that the right to marriage was deemed so fundamental
that no state interest could justify a limitation on that right for same-sex
couples. 104 There was simply no compelling state interest for excluding
same-sex couples from the fundamental liberty to marry.
In contrast to the same-sex marriage context, in the guardianship
context, the State has a long-standing parens patriae interest in
protecting its citizens from harm. This recognized state interest gives
the State a thumb on the scale in the substantive due process analysis in
the guardianship context. 105 Although courts have recognized that
guardianship implicates numerous liberty interests that are
constitutionally protected, 106 courts have never wholly rejected the
parens patriae underpinnings of guardianship or the general legitimacy
deciding case on procedural due grounds set forth in the certiorari petition). See generally D.B.
v. Dardall, 826 F.3d 721 (4th Cir. 2016).
103 Reno v. Flores, 507 US 292, 302 (1993); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
104 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.
105 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 236 (1990) (concluding that regulation
permitting state to treat a mentally ill prisoner with antipsychotic medications against his will
may be a constitutionally permissible “accommodation between an inmate’s liberty interest in
avoiding the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs and the State’s interests in providing
appropriate medical treatment to reduce the danger that an inmate suffering from a serious
mental disorder represents to himself or others”); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (1986)
(recognizing that the State has compelling interest in exercising parens patriae power to protect
persons unable to care for themselves though there are some limitations on that power). See
generally D.B. v. Cardall, 826 F.3d 721, 740–41 (4th Cir. 2016) (recognizing the fundamental
right to raise one’s child, but concluding that this right is subject to the State’s parens patriae
interest in protecting the welfare and safety of children). For state cases recognizing the tension
between the individual’s liberty interest and the State’s parens patriae interest in the
guardianship context, see In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1089–91(Utah 1981) (recognizing the
need to balance the important personal rights and liberties that may be compromised by an
incompetency determination with the State’s legitimate interest of ensuring that individuals are
able to care for themselves and do not harm themselves or others); see Salzman, Rethinking
Guardianship, supra note 17.
106 See cases cited supra note 74. Guardianship may infringe on many particular liberty
interests recognized by the courts. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S 558, 578 (2003) (right to
privacy); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S 833, 851 (1992) (right to make personal
decisions regarding marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationship, child rearing,
and education); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S 261, 278–79 (1990) (right to
refuse unwanted medical treatment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (freedom
from bodily restraint; right to contract, engage in an occupation, acquire useful knowledge,
marry, establish a home and bring up children); see Matter of Leon, 43 N.Y.S.3d 769 (N.Y. Sur.
Ct. 2016) (recognizing fundamental liberty interests implicated in guardianship); In re St.
Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr. 607 N.Y.S.2d 574, 578 (Sup. Ct. 1993), decision modified and
remanded sub nom., In re St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 627 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1995) (finding
right to make medical and health-related decisions is protected by state and federal
constitutions). Courts have also recognized the separately identifiable liberty interest in
avoiding the stigma of incompetency and mental illness. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,
600–01 (1979); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425–26 (1979); In re Hedin, 528 N.W.2d 567,
574 (Iowa 1995).
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of, and need for, the institution of guardianship. Still, Obergefell’s
analytic methodology of identifying fundamental liberties in light of
evolving national understandings offers some hope that the Court could
one day recognize a fundamental liberty interest in the general exercise
of legal capacity to make one’s own decisions and have them recognized
by others that would either outweigh or be equivalent to any
governmental interest in protecting individuals from harm.
While the decision in Obergefell presents some cause for hope, that
hope may prove illusory for several reasons. First, not only was the
decision highly contested when it was issued in 2015, 107 but the
composition of the Court could easily become more conservative in the
foreseeable future. Any change in composition could reverse Obergefell’s
consideration of evolving standards, reverting to the recognition of a
more limited scope of liberty interests securely grounded in historic
tradition. If the Court became unwilling to determine liberty interests in
light of evolving national standards there is little hope that the Court
would recognize a liberty interest in the exercise of legal capacity by all
citizens. Further, while the Obergefell Court uses lofty language about
the right to make choices, exercise autonomy, make intimate choices,
and define and express one’s identity, as noted above, the Court’s
decision is carefully tied to the right to marry and its recognized sanctity
as a matter of long-standing national tradition. 108 No court has
recognized a general constitutionally protected liberty interest in
107 Even liberal scholars present compelling critiques of the Court’s decision. Though
sympathetic to the indignity experienced by same-sex couples excluded from marriage, some
criticize Obergefell’s reliance on an undefined and elastic concept of dignity that can be used to
support a liberty interest in potentially undesirable expressions of autonomy and selfdetermination. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Dangers of the Constitutional ‘Right to Dignity’,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/thedangerous-doctrine-of-dignity/391796 (discussing the tenuous basis for the liberty interest
recognized in Lawrence and Obergefell and citing to Justice Scalia’s undesirable invocation of
the dignitary interest in McDonald to find a liberty interest to bear arms as an expression of
“self-determination,” “dignity [or] respect”); Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of
Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (2011) (reviewing cases and observing that dignity has various
“conceptions and functions [that] are dynamic and context-driven”). The line drawing could
prove difficult. But see, e.g., Burr v. Navarro, 641 F. App’x 194, 196 (3d Cir. 2016) (concluding
that Obergefell’s fundamental liberty interest does not protect decision not to wear seatbelt).
108 Compare, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599–2602, 2604–05 (grounding decision in right
to marry), with Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597–98 (discussing concept of liberty that encompasses
the right to make choices, etc.), 2599 (describing marriage as an act of self-definition). In
Obergefell, as in Glucksberg, the Court explicitly noted that the right to self-definition,
autonomy, and expression of identity is not limitless. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602;
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (“[W]e have a tradition of carefully formulating
the interest at stake in substantive-due-process cases.”); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725 (noting that
while many of the constitutionally-protected liberties have roots in personal autonomy, the
constitution does not necessarily protect the “abstract concept of personal autonomy”);
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 727 (“That many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all
important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected . . . .” (citation omitted)).
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exercising autonomy or making choices that define one’s identity. And,
any future court that might be willing to embrace a fundamental liberty
interest in a general right to make choices and exercise autonomy would
have to deviate from prior decisions that have suggested that individuals
found to be “incapacitated” may be excluded from the exercise of certain
specific, previously recognized fundamental rights such as the right to
make medical decisions. 109 In a future challenge, however, perhaps the
Court could be persuaded that the question is not whether persons
lacking capacity have a right to make decisions, but whether there is an
adequate basis, considering evolving standards, for persons with
limitations in cognitive abilities to be wholly excluded from the
enterprise of expressing personal identity, making choices, and
exercising autonomy.
Finally, there are some individuals who will need supports and
services to thrive outside of guardianship. It is important to bear in
mind that it is not enough to use constitutional liberty claims to move
people out of guardianship but fail to ensure the availability of adequate
supports and services outside of guardianship. As noted above, this was
a limitation in the earlier efforts to move individuals out of institutions
based on a constitutional right to decline treatment deemed inadequate
or unwanted. In those cases, the constitutional claims provided a
sufficient legal basis for orders to discharge institutional residents but
not to ensure that they had sufficient services in the community. 110 The
hope is that the constitutional recognition of a right to make the range
of personal decisions outside of guardianship will generate support for
the provision of formal and informal supports and services for those
with limitations in decision-making abilities. Certainly, we as a nation
are recognizing the value of community-based services that are personcentered and the imperative to provide these mechanisms for support as
a matter of social obligation. The goal would be that once there is a
recognition of a constitutional right to exercise legal capacity and be free
from guardianship, disability rights activists will follow the example of
those who have worked to develop adequate community resources so
that individuals with disabilities have a meaningful opportunity to

109 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723–25 (noting repeatedly that the Court’s jurisprudence
protects the right of a competent person to make medical decisions or reject life-sustaining
treatment). See generally id. at 731 (recognizing the legitimate tradition of protecting vulnerable
groups from abuse, neglect, and mistakes).
110 See Bagenstos, Deinstitutionalization Litigation, supra note 14, at 10–13 (noting that
while deinstitutionalization did move many people from segregated and often inhumane
conditions to richer lives in the community, the due process challenges to involuntary
institutionalization gave states far greater incentives to move people out of institutions than to
fund adequate services in the community, leaving many in the community to fend for
themselves without adequate support).
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participate in all aspects of life as full citizens. 111
CONCLUSION
Even if individuals with disabilities could successfully obtain legal
recognition of the right to be fully integrated in social and community
life and their right to make decisions as persons entitled to dignity and
self-determination, change will not be immediate—the pull of
protectionism and parens patriae are incredibly strong and
guardianship (and its historical antecedents) are well accepted as a
matter of law and policy. But if we could eradicate broad guardianships
of unlimited duration, and resist the presumption that individuals with
disabilities cannot maintain, develop, or regain capabilities and skills, we
could upset the current guardianship construct and begin moving
toward the recognition of universal legal capacity. The integration
mandate of the ADA is an important tool in the effort toward full
participation of individuals with some limitations in decision-making
abilities. But is that statutory tool sufficient in this context that defines
our fundamental personhood?
As noted by Michael Waterstone, “[t]here is something
important—some would say redemptive—about using the Constitution
to try to achieve a more progressive vision of society.” 112 This is why I
feel the need to reach for the Constitution in the guardianship context
where the courts consider a person’s right to make legally recognized
decisions, define one’s self, and participate in those interactions central
to citizenship. The use of both constitutional principles of liberty and
the ADA’s integration mandate can help move us away from restrictive
guardianship regimes and toward the provision of assistance that
enhances capabilities and recognizes the right to legal capacity for all.
We may need both to resist the centuries-old legitimacy of parens
patriae and the State’s obligation to manage the affairs of those deemed
vulnerable.

111
112

See Bagenstos, Deinstitutionalization Litigation, supra note 14, at 10–13.
See Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law, supra note 5, at 557.

